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Along with all other defence-related issues, defence research is a controversial area for
EU action. Until recently, defence issues have not figured prominently among EU policy
discussions and defence research has played little, if any, role in European technology
policy. Although the Framework Programme is funding research projects that could have
potential military applications in addition to their explicit civilian goals, there is no
strategy on how to address such “dual-use” research activities. Yet, this paper argues that
the interaction between technologies developed for civilian and for military use has led to
a situation in which it is increasingly difficult to refer to distinct military and civilian
technology bases. From the point of view of policy formulation a strict separation
between defence and civilian technologies is increasingly appearing as anachronistic.
The extent to which “dual-use” research will be explicitly considered in the development
of the 6
th Framework Programme will again emerge as a matter of debate. The paper
presents and discusses different avenues through which dual-use and defence-related




Mainstream debates on European research policy have tended to ignore the role of
defence research and defence production in shaping the European innovation system. One
can venture several reasons as to why this has been the case. On the political and security
fronts the end of the Cold War and the economic conditions of the early 1990s brought
about a fall in defence R&D expenditure. As investment in emerging IT-related sectors
and services rocketed, stimulated by the prospect of emerging commercial markets of
colossal proportions, defence R&D no longer commanded the same political priorities as
it had over the preceding decades. The stagnant research investment in a sector whose
“raison d’être” was being increasingly questioned by public opinion could no longer be
seen as a motor of technological development. In fact, the central arguments of defence
science and technology policy strategists shifted. Instead of fencing off critics with
examples of how defence R&D had eventually led to technological developments that
had been appropriated by society at large (“spin-off”), the main concern became the
exploitation of technological developments occurring elsewhere in the economy for the
benefit of military production (“spin-in”).
While defence research descended in the hierarchy of political priorities it remained a
controversial area for EU action, along with all other defence-related issues. Although the
Maastricht Treaty introduced the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” (CFSP) as one
of the “legs” of the European Union, the involvement of the European Commission on
defence issues has not yet received undivided support. The original Treaty of Rome did
not cover security matters and included an article (223) allowing any Member State to
take “such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests
of security” when dealing with military production and trade matters. The article has
often been interpreted as an exemption from Commission rules for all military-related
activities. Historically, cooperation in foreign affairs under the European Political
Cooperation (EPC) remained outside the Treaty and took place outside the Community3
framework. CFSP heralded, in principle, a change to this situation, but the Maastricht
Treaty tasked the Western European Union (not the European Commission) with the
elaboration and implementation of Union decisions with defence implications (Article
J4).
Against this background the involvement of the Commission in security-related issues
(including research) is breaking new ground and encounters opposition from a variety of
fronts. Political attitudes towards defence issues vary markedly from country to country
and obviously from political party to political party, and some groups in the European
Parliament regard with acute suspicion any Commission move into security-related
matters.
Therefore, defence issues did not, until recently, figure prominently among EU policy
discussions. Classical reference works on the European Community could very well do
without a single reference to defence and security matters.1 In this context of perceived
lower priority and sustained political difficulties, it is not surprising that the incentives to
address the role of defence research in European technology policy were, to say the least,
feeble.
From the observation of these trends, should we conclude that defence research matters
have no place in the development of a European approach to science and technology
issues? This paper argues that defence research requires attention when dealing with
issues that may shape the future European science and technology system. Changes have
occurred, both in the technological and political fronts driving the Commission to take on
more responsibilities on defence-industrial issues. It may be true that, in comparison with
the rapid changes in Information Technologies and their applications, and the
environmental and welfare challenges faced by European societies, defence R&D policy
is unlikely to ride on the crest of popular attention. However, defence-led investment still
accounts for a substantial share of total R&D effort and of Government R&D
appropriations. This research effort and the manufacturing and engineering skills that still
depend on defence work are being confronted with rapid changes in the relationship
between defence and civil technology. In addition, the political context is shifting: the
need for a common European policy on defence issues is becoming more evident on the
wake of the Balkan crises and the re-emergence of difficult political issues in areas like
technology export controls. The paper will briefly review the nature of these trends and
discuss their implications for European research policy.
Defence research: main trends and recent issues
Dual-use and its implications
The changing relationship between military and civilian technologies
Research and technological development efforts can often result in a variety of
applications, regardless of their initial funding sources. Although this observation can be
considered quite banal, it acquires a distinct relevance when dealing with the relationship
                                                     
1 This is the case for instance of Jones and Budd (1994), a classical reference book on the EC that saw five editions
between 1985 and 1994.4
between military and civilian technologies. That a technology that had initially been
developed in the pursuit of military goals may then be applied to civilian objectives (and
vice versa) has important implications for science and technology policy and its
relationship with foreign and defence policy. This is not an occasional occurrence; the
outputs of R&D activities can often be applied to military as well as civilian goals; in
other words, they are “dual-use”. In fact, it is common for R&D to be conducted for both
military and civil goals within large diversified firms (Stewart 1989).
Besides, the relationship between R&D activities conducted primarily for defence goals
and those oriented initially to civilian applications has changed. In many key areas, like
electronics and information technologies, the pace of civilian-led innovation has
outstripped military-led innovative efforts.2 Nowadays, components and products
developed for civilian markets often provide better performance and cost specifications
than similar items developed specifically for military customers. For more than a decade
it has been widely recognised that the success of military production depends on the
existence of robust commercial firms and industrial activity (US Congress, Office of
Technology Assessment 1988). In many sectors defence customers have been forced to
resort to commercial technologies.
Take for instance electronics. While defence R&D accounted for the early development
of most electronics industries, as the technologies matured and the cost of production fell,
the commercial markets soon outstripped military demand. In the US, government sales
of semiconductors (including but not limited to the military) accounted for only 1.3% of
total US sales in 1995, and the military market was shrinking at a rate of 15% per year
(Cooper and Finnegan 1995). Meanwhile the costs of developing and producing new
semiconductor chips have escalated. Between 1980 and 1991, R&D annual expenditures
by US semiconductors producers grew from $600 million to $2.9 billion. Manufacturing
costs have grown even faster: the cost of building an advanced wafer production facility
rose from $25 million in 1989 to over $500 million in 1992 (US. Congress. Office of
Technology Assessment 1993b). The combination of growing costs and market
stagnation has left the military with no other solution than having to resort to components
and semiconductors developed for commercial applications.
The importance of these changes for science and technology policy in Europe were
recognised by the European Commission in its Communication on The Challenges facing
the European defence-related industry (European Commission 1996). Although the
Community research and technological development programmes explicitly focus on
civil objectives, they are bound to fund projects with defence applications. According to
European Commission estimates (European Commission 1996) as much as one third of
the overall Community research budget is invested in areas of “potential dual-use
interest”.
                                                     
2 This is not surprising given the changing balance between the R&D efforts funded by the military and the R&D paid
for by other economic actors. In 1960, for instance, the US DoD funded one third of all R&D carried out in the
Western world. By 1992, this percentage was less than 14% and falling (Alic et al. 1992).5
Dual-use research policy
Defence-industrial policies, particularly in the US, have tried to address this situation by
developing mechanisms to improve the exploitation of the results of “dual-use research”
across different, military and civilian, applications. Elsewhere, we have defined “dual-
use policies” as any course of action adopted by a public or private organisation to
facilitate the wide use of dual-use technologies in both military and civilian applications
(Molas and Robinson 1997).3 Given the large diversity of dual-use technologies and the
even broader variety of ways in which these technologies can flow between military and
civilian applications (Molas-Gallart 1997) dual-use policies can be very different in their
definition and objectives. Indeed, there have been significant shifts in their meaning and
orientation. In the US, where the concept has been more widely used in official contexts,
the emphasis shifted from the application of technological capabilities initially developed
in the defence field to civilian applications, to developing means to exploit for defence
applications technologies developed elsewhere.4
Sectoral differences
It must be noted that, although the trend for military innovation to become more
dependent on the results of civilian-oriented research is broad and affects many
technological fields, it is by no means ubiquitous. There are sectors where present
evidence suggests that defence R&D continues to finance the larger share of research
with dual-use applications. This occurs particularly in fields where high-costs, low
volume technologies are being developed for use in very specialised applications where
performance is a paramount concern.
The most important example is perhaps advanced materials: the development of lighter
and stronger materials for (mainly) aerospace applications continues to be funded to a
large extent by defence monies, although many of the technologies find commercial
applications later on. It has been reported for instance that, as late as in the mid-90s, the
US Department of Defense funded 73% of all US research in metallurgy and materials
(National Research Council 1996). This is not surprising: the aerospace sector is one of
the main drivers of advanced materials research (particularly structural materials), and,
within the sector, new materials are customarily applied first to military aircraft.5
It follows that dual-use research policies cannot focus exclusively in the defence
exploitation of innovations generated elsewhere. It must be acknowledged that some
areas of research, with important potential civilian applications, retain the military as
their potential “first-user” even in the present context of budgetary strictures in the
defence field.
                                                     
3 This includes both policies aimed at generating dual-use technological capabilities and, more important, policies
aimed at increasing the capabilities to apply dual-use technologies across as broad an application area as possible.
4 As “dual-use policy” has meant very different things in different policy contexts, support for dual-use research, as
recommended in some quarters (Defence Committee and Trade and Industry Committee 1995), is too vague a
proposal.
5 The approach to the introduction of new structural materials in commercial aircraft is rather conservative, due above
all, to the safety concerns and regulations that characterise this segment of industrial activity.6
Dual-use and technology controls
This paper focuses mainly on the relationship between defence and civilian research and
innovation, and the opportunities it offers for a wider exploitation of research results. Yet,
the same dual-use character of many R&D efforts and technological developments is
posing important foreign policy and security problems related to the control of the
international transfer and proliferation of weapons technology. Why is this so?
Dual use policies promoting the establishment of dual use technology transfer
mechanisms can be used not only to assist in the diversification (or even conversion) of
defence-related facilities, but also to support military production. Whenever fluid
channels exist for the application of military technology developments to civilian use, it
is also possible to follow the contrary route: emphasis on the exploitation of civilian
technologies in military production is increasing the relevance of commercial technology
for weapons manufacturing. Further, the emergence of integrated civil/military industry
segments and the use of common components and sub-systems in both military and
civilian production can make it more difficult to track and monitor the development of
military capabilities and therefore may pose a problem to anybody concerned with
proliferation matters.
How to address these issues constitutes an important element of the CFSP, and has been a
concern of the European Commission already for some years. First and foremost, the
Commission has had to intervene to prevent the internal market from being used to export
military-relevant technologies through the EU Member States with more lax export
control regulations. A common approach to export control appears therefore as a natural
corollary of the internal market when dual-use technologies exist. The need for
harmonisation in this area of foreign policy has led to the development of EU-wide
regulations on the export of “dual-use goods” (OJ No L278, 30.10.96).6
Defence R&D in Europe: some aggregate data
An initial caveat: defining Defence R&D
Any attempt to present a summary overview of the defence R&D efforts is immediately
faced with a serious difficulty: the scarcity of available data and its suspect reliability.
Cross-national comparisons and longitudinal analysis alike have to be approached with
caution. The causes for this situation can be traced back to the traditional secrecy with
which defence agencies and firms treat data and information, but more importantly to the
changing relationship between military and civilian research and the ensuing difficulties
to capture the shifting situation through the use of old indicators. In particular, the
problems are bound to become more intense if the efforts to improve the exploitation of
R&D efforts (in both military and civilian applications regardless of the source of funds)
meet with any sort of success. Dual-use policies may further blur the distinction between
what is to be considered “civilian” and “military” research.
                                                     
6 Yet, these regulations are not in line with some of the international technology control regimes of which the Member
States are signatories. Particularly the regulations in the Chemical Weapons Convention regarding the control of
dual-use technologies with potential applications in chemical weapons, do not fit with the present approach defined in
EU regulations, which refer instead to the control of the export of technologies listed in specific control lists. For a
detailed analysis of this issue see Molas-Gallart and Robinson (1997).7
Besides, national data sets are based on disparate definitions and approaches to the
construction of defence R&D indicators, which often do not comply with the Frascati
definitions. In France, for instance, the Ministry of Defence releases three different
indicators of defence R&D, plus a further one by the Ministry of Research. The latter
attempts to provide an estimate following the definitions used in the “Frascati manual”
(Serfati 1998). In Britain, the Ministry of Defence has traditionally not conformed to
Frascati definitions, although other departments publish defence R&D data according to
it, and the Ministry of Defence has tried to reconcile its practices with the Frascati
conventions (Gummett and James 1998).
Facing this difficulty in acquiring even nationally-based data suitable for a longitudinal
analysis, researchers have had to rely on the only source of long-term, comparable
defence R&D indicators: the OECD. Yet the OECD approach to defining defence vis-à-
vis civilian R&D may lead to inaccurate estimates.7 According to the Frascati manual
“...the criterion is not the nature of the product or subject (or who is funding the
programme) but the objective” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development 1994, p. 77). This approach addresses the fact that not all defence research
is supported by defence agencies and, at times, defence agencies support research that
appears to pursue civilian objectives.8 Yet the OECD definition relies on the ability of an
analyst to elucidate whether a research programme or a project is being conducted
“primarily” for military or for civilian goals. In doing so, this approach is faced with the
problem of how to deal with research programmes that, explicitly or implicitly, pursue
dual-use objectives.9 Trying to estimate defence R&D on the basis of the potential
application of the research effort or its primary goal is fraught with problems and often
subjected to judgements that may eventually prove incorrect. Taking into consideration
the dual-use potential of much R&D, a safer approach to defining Defence R&D would
be to include all R&D funded by defence agencies plus other R&D expenditures
officially identified as being conducted for military purposes, although funded by other
public organisations. Yet, no R&D data is collected on this basis, and therefore the use of
present OECD indicators on defence R&D for the purposes of national comparisons and
longitudinal analysis must be approached with care. Only the most general comparisons
and trend analysis can be carried out. In the absence of much needed improvements to
data collection, any detailed analysis of trends and any attempt at formally testing
hypothesis through economic modelling, would require, at least, a case by case validation
of the indicators by reference to the original national data sources.
                                                     
7 For a complete discussion of this issue see Molas-Gallart (1999).
8 In the US, for instance, nuclear weapons research has always been funded by the Department of Energy. In Britain, in
the days of the Ministries of Aviation and of Technology in the 1960s, the main defence-related research
establishments were outside the scope of the Ministry of Defence.
9 As the OECD defines basic research as research primarily undertaken to acquire new knowledge, it follows that,
strictly speaking, no basic research can be considered defence R&D (even if it is funded by defence agencies). We
should note that, although basic research accounts for a relatively low share of total R&D funded by defence
agencies, defence agencies fund a very substantial portion of basic R&D in several scientific fields. The US
Department of Defense supports 68% of all federally-funded research in social psychology, 60% of research in
mathematics and computer sciences, and 40% in psychology (Hagelin and Reppy 1998).8
National differences and general trends
Given the difficulties outlined above, here we can provide no more than a very general
discussion of defence R&D trends based on existing analyses of national data sources and
a sketchy international comparison based on OECD indicators. Although defence R&D
expenditure has declined in most countries, it still remains very significant. Figure 1
presents the evolution of defence R&D budgets as a percentage of government R&D
budgets or appropriations according to OECD data, for the largest EU Member Countries
and for the EU as a whole.10 In general we can appreciate a downward trend in the
evolution of this relative indicator, yet the downfall is not as sharp as some might have
expected. The aggregate EU data shows a stable but slow downward trend, with about
15% of government R&D appropriations being still applied primarily to defence goals.
Yet, this aggregate figure hides important differences across countries.
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In those EU countries at the forefront of military technology development (mainly Britain
and France), defence R&D remains particularly important. Only in the last years has
French expenditure in defence R&D as a percentage of total government expenditure
fallen slightly under one third, but its present absolute level is the same as in the heyday
of military expenditure in the mid-1980s (Serfati 1998). In Britain defence R&D as a
percentage of total government expenditure is still close to 40%. In Germany, where the
                                                     
10 The level of defence R&D in most small EU countries with no sizeable defence industry (not represented in the
table) is often negligible.9
level of defence R&D expenditure is much lower, it has remained stable (around 10% of
government R&D appropriations) for the last two decades.
In some countries with smaller, niche, defence industries, defence research is retaining or
even increasing its role. Stability is the trend in the Netherlands, with R&D accounting
for about 1% of the total defence budget, and remaining at this level over the years (Smit
1998). In Spain, defence R&D has sharply increased over the last two years and is
reaching unprecedented levels of investment; yet, the Spanish figures are very likely to
include engineering and manufacturing activities that could not be classified as R&D
using standard Frascati criteria (Molas-Gallart et al. 1998). In comparison, Italy has
experienced a substantial decline.
We can conclude that defence R&D deserves attention as it remains an important element
in the definition of public Science and Technology policies. The decline in defence
budgets has stopped well short of erasing the relevance of defence-related research
activities. It could therefore appear as surprising that defence R&D has not featured in the
EU research strategy. The following section explains this apparent inconsistency by
reference to the political backdrop of the evolving EU involvement in defence and
security matters.
The political context: European defence research and the CFSP
We turn our attention to the policy environment partially responsible for the marginal
consideration that EU research policies have given to the defence sector. Until recently,
the European Commission has been reluctant to address this issue as well as any other
defence-related problem: it was broadly understood that defence problems fell beyond the
scope of action of the European Communities. This approach was supported by Article
223 of the treaty of Rome (Article 296 of the Amsterdam Treaty). The article states:
1. The provisions of this Treaty shall not preclude the application of the following rules:
(a) No Member State shall be obliged to supply information, the disclosure of which it considers
contrary to the essential interests of its security;
(b) Any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the
essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms,
munitions and war material; such measures shall not, however, adversely affect the conditions of
competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically
military purposes.
Although the Article falls well short of preventing all actions by the European
Communities that could affect the defence-related industries, it is often still interpreted in
this manner.11 Most Member Countries have traditionally applied a very broad
interpretation of Article 223, assuming it to mean a complete exemption of all defence-
                                                     
11 In fact, the same Treaty of Rome, in the much less quoted, Article 225, allows the Commission or any Member State
who considers that a Member State is making “improper use” of the powers provided by Article 223 to bring the
matter to the European Court of Justice.10
related areas from Commission action. This approach is now being increasingly
challenged, both at the political level and by the Commission itself.12
The most important turning point was the signature of the Treaty on European Union
(Maastricht Treaty) on 7 February 1992. It sets up the structure of the European Union as
resting upon three "pillars": (1) the European Communities, (2) the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP), and (3) co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs. The CFSP is
described in Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty as comprising “all questions related to
the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy,
which might in time lead to a common defence.” The same article calls on the Western
European Union (WEU) to elaborate and implement Union decisions with defence
implications, thus making the WEU the executive arm of the CFSP.13
The slow progress in the development and implementation of the CFSP has affected the
way in which the European institutions can address defence issues, including
procurement, and R&D policies. Every step has had to be supported by substantial
declaratory policy. An initial move towards explicit involvement of the European
Commission in defence industrial issues was the Communication of January 1996
(European Commission 1996) on the challenges faced by the European defence
industries, later endorsed by the European Parliament in May 1997. Later in 1997 the
Commission proposed a Common Position to develop a European armaments policy
(European Commission 1997) covering a broad variety of defence industrial and
technology issues. In December 1998, Britain and France signed the Saint-Malo
Declaration acknowledging the need to develop a European defence capability supported
by a strong European defence technology. Finally the Presidency Conclusions of the
European Council summit in Helsinki (December 1999) adopted a Presidency Report on
“Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence” setting specific
targets to develop a capacity to conduct EU-led military operations in response to
international crises.
There is now an open search for ways in which the EU can take on defence and security
responsibilities, including defence production issues; a far cry from the times in which
defence was generally understood to be clearly out of the scope of action of the European
Communities. A new framework for the elaboration of defence-related policies by the
European Communities is emerging. As Chris Patten, European Commissioner for
External Relations, stated in a speech in December 1999:
A European security and defence policy, to be operationally effective, needs the support of a number of
complimentary building blocks. ... For example, [it] cannot be developed in the absence of a
competitive and open European defence industrial and technological base ... We in the Commission can
contribute to this with a range of instruments in areas like public procurement, the internal market,
research and competition (Patten 1999).
                                                     
12 An apparently minor but nevertheless significant development has been the September 1999 ruling of the European
Court of Justice against Spain (Case C-414/97), who had invoked article 223 to exclude from VAT intra-comunitary
transfer of arms, munitions and military equipment.
13 The Maastricht Treaty annex on the WEU established the intention of creating an European Armaments Agency to
increase co-operation in the field of arms production among Member States; yet its constitution has been delayed by
profound disagreements about its potential role, structure and responsibilities. It is now expected that the WEU will
be subsumed within the European Commission.11
These developments, away as they may seem from the research policy domain, are
however playing a key enabling role in the definition of a EU-wide research policy. This
can be illustrated by reference to the discussion on defence-related and dual-use research
that took place while the 5
th Framework Programme was being prepared.
The Commission support of research and technological development activities has always
addressed only civilian objectives. However, it has long been recognised that dual-use
research has always been carried out through the Framework Programme. In internal
discussions while the 5
th Framework Programme was being prepared, Commission
officials at the then DG-XII (now DG Research) had noted that more than 8% of the total
number of participants in the BRITE, EURAM, ESPRIT, ACTS and TRANSPORT
programmes were defence-related organisations. Of course, the projects in which they
participated complied with the civilian objectives of the Framework programme; yet, the
involvement of firms and laboratories with a very high degree of dependence on military
work, suggested the dual-use nature of the projects under development. Previously, the
European Commission had estimated that as much as one third of the overall Community
research budget was invested in areas of “potential dual-use interest” (European
Commission 1996).
The issue of how to deal with dual-use technologies in the context of the 5
th Framework
emerged explicitly during the discussions that led to its design and approval. This topic
had already appeared in relation to the definition of the 4
th Framework Programme. Then,
the “Industrial R&D Advisory Committee of the Commission of the European
Communities” (IRDAC) argued in a discussion document that the Commission should
play an important role in examining the extent to which the results of defence-related
research could be used for civilian purposes (IRDAC 1993). Similar issues were
discussed much more actively during the definition of the 5
th Framework Programme,
particularly during 1996 and 1997. Not only had “dual-use” policies become established
in some EU countries and, particularly, in the United States, but the Commission had
issued its 1996 Communication on the challenges faced by the European defence
industries. The Commission Communication was discussed extensively in the European
Parliament a few months before the Parliament dealt with the Framework Programme.
The Parliament approved the Communication and issued a Report on it concluding, inter
alia, that national governments should agree on long-term R&D projects, and that the
EUCLID14 defence research programme and the Community R&D programmes should
be strengthened and better co-ordinated (Titley 1997, p.15). The opinion of the
“Economic and Social Committee of the European Communities” (ESC) on the same
Communication stated that “redefining funding for scientific and technological research
in dual use terms might help to improve the technology base of the European defence
industry” (ESC 1997). Yet, an official recognition of this need in the Commission
research policy was fraught with difficulties, related mostly to the unclear responsibilities
of the Commission and other EU institutions in defence matters. A debate followed.
Some Commission officials and organisations like the European Defence Industrial
Group (EDIG) were clearly in support of the establishment of a co-ordinated approach to
defence and civil research in Europe. An Industry/Research Centres/Commission
                                                     
14 EUCLID is a European defence R&D programme managed by the Western European Armaments Group.12
working group argued in an internal report that the presence of dual-use research in both
EUCLID and the Framework Programme provided a chance to exploit synergies, and that
dual-use projects should not be negatively discriminated in the Framework Programme.15
The working group concluded that these issues had to be considered in the discussions
leading to the definition of the 5
th Framework so that further steps would be “facilitated”
in the 6
th Framework, and pointed out that further steps could be taken particularly if the
CFSP was to become a reality. Therefore, the conclusions of this working group linked
the explicit consideration of dual-use and defence research issues within the Framework
Programme, to the success in defining a CFSP. Such linkage was also made at the time,
by critics of the inclusion of reference to dual-use research in the 5
th Framework. For
instance, Stelios Argyros a MEP actively involved in the discussions on the 5
th
Framework put forward this point in his “Opinion” on the 1996 Commission
Communication. Argyros considered that proposals for the Framework Programme to
attempt to enhance synergies between military and civil R&D activities, incorporating
dual-use considerations were “remarkably misguided” (Argyros 1996 p.3). Among other
reasons Argyros argued that this approach would “suggest that the Framework
Programme is a suitable tool for forging a common foreign and security policy (CFSP).
…. Just because such a policy does not yet exist, the Commission or individual Member
States should not try to bring it about through EU research policy” (Argyros 1996, p.3).
In other words, the inclusion of defence-related initiatives in the Framework Programme
had to be the result of, rather than the means to, a CFSP.
The reluctance to make an explicit reference to dual-use issues in the 5
th Framework was
buttressed by those political groups that were completely opposed to any mention of
defence-related research among the Commission responsibilities. Given the political
difficulties that this issue was likely to open, it was decided to let matters stand where
they were.
In the context of a policy vacuum, defence companies continue to access Framework
Programme funds through dual-use research projects, but still face the uncertainty that
their defence activities may count against their chances of success when submitting
proposals. Not only is there no strategic vision behind a European defence or dual-use
research policy, but, in the absence of explicit guidelines, it continues to be left to
individual evaluators to decide whether a project which could have defence applications
should be funded.
Conclusions: European research policy and new perspectives
on European security
This paper has argued that defence-related research remains an important component of
European scientific and technological activity. There are opportunities for the wider
                                                     
15 For some time, defence industrialists had privately voiced concerns that, in practice, they had been discriminated in
the implementation of the Framework Programme. They felt there had been instances in which they had failed to win
research projects because the evaluators had reacted negatively to the presence of a “defence company” requesting
EC research funds, regardless of whether the objective of the study was (or was presented as) civilian. In the absence
of clear guidelines on dealing with dual-use issues, it was often left to the individual reviewers to make private
assessment as to whether or not the involvement of a defence-related company was acceptable. Although formally,
defence-related firms could not be discriminated against, in practice their defence nature appears to have barred their
participation in some EC-funded research projects.13
exploitation of research efforts and improved coordination of government research
investments. It is however this interaction between security and research matters that has
so far stifled the development of Europe-wide common defence R&D strategies. The
Framework Programme has yet to address the implications of dual-use technologies and
has not taken into consideration the activities of the much more modest European defence
research programme (EUCLID). While the exploitation of dual-use capabilities in as
broad a range of applications as possible has been a priority of US research policy for
several years, in Europe these issues have been left to the national authorities.
Meanwhile, the growing interaction between technologies developed for civilian and for
military use has led to a situation in which it is increasingly difficult to refer to distinct
military and civilian “technology bases”. From the point of view of policy formulation a
strict separation between defence and civilian technologies is increasingly appearing as
anachronistic. Many problems will emerge from such a development, particularly in the
area of arms and technology transfers. In any case, a strict separation between defence
and civilian technological activities cannot constitute the basis of a research policy
programme, nor can it be a criterion on which to select research projects submitted to a
programme.16 The Framework Programme has long been funding research into dual-use
technologies, and is bound to continue to do so. The extent to which the consideration of
dual-use will become an explicit element in the development of the 6
th Framework
Programme will again emerge as a matter of debate, probably with more force than ever
before.
There are different avenues through which dual-use and defence-related research could
be given formal consideration in the development and implementation of the 6
th
Framework Programme. These will be contingent however on the evolving role of the
Western European Union and the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), and
their relationship with the European Commission. If EUCLID continues its activities and
the WEAG retains the responsibility for its management, an avenue would be a formal
process of co-ordination between EUCLID and the Framework Programme. As it stands,
such co-ordination would remain a difficult task. Not only are they very different in size,
but they are also managed in different ways: while the Framework Programme is
managed at the European level, EUCLID relies on national agencies to administer
substantial areas of the programme.
Another avenue would be the explicit inclusion of dual-use objectives and considerations
in the 6
th Framework Programme. Dual-use considerations could be made a criterion for
the selection of research programmes or projects. Also, the Commission could identify
key dual-use technology fields where European research efforts are weak, and
incorporate them into the Framework Programme planning.
These are difficult questions, both at the political and at the policy level and they will
require early attention. In any case, however, the organisational structure and the goals of
a European defence and security policy need to be firmly established, so that specific
defence related research objectives can be developed within a European framework.
                                                     
16 For a more detailed discussion of this issue see Molas-Gallart and Robinson (1997).14
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